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Recently, various side-channel attacks on widely used encryption methods have been dis-
covered. Extensive research is currently undertaken to develop new types of combined en-
cryption and authentication mechanisms. Developers of security systems ask whether to im-
plement methods recommended by international standards or to choose one of the new pro-
posals. We explain the nature of the attacks and how they can be avoided, and recommend 
a sound, provably secure solution: the CCM standard. 
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Recently, various side-channel attacks on symmetric encipherment schemes have been dis-
covered. These attacks exploit linear properties characteristic for most symmetric stream ci-
phers internationally standardized in conjunction with some encodings and padding methods. 
Authenticated encryption has been concluded to be the soundest way to prevent such at-
tacks once and forever.  
 
Current research thus focuses on the design of mechanisms providing authentication and 
encryption at once. Though significant progress has been made, there is yet no globally ac-
cepted solution, let alone one internationally standardized. Any solution, before it can be 
globally accepted, must undergo extensive analysis and testing by the global cryptographic 
community. This procedure took almost ten years for the AES, and it will take several years 
for new authenticate-and-encipher mechanisms as well. At best such new mechanism can 
be expected in the next revisions of the international standards. 
 
The many results published make it difficult for practitioners to get a clear picture and to 
come to sound conclusions. Designers of security systems are facing the question whether 
to implement those mechanisms recommended by international standards or to trust one of 
the new proposals. On the one hand, compliance with standards has interoperability advan-
tages and may be a demand for legal reasons. On the other hand, nobody would build a new 
system on building blocks with known security flaws. But although new proposals promise to 
resolve the issues, they bear the risk of unknown weaknesses and thus are not viable alter-
natives before their international approval.  
 
However, CCM, a new standard implementing authenticated encryption, has already been in-
ternationally approved. CCM provably resolves the problems and thus can safely be imple-
mented in the next generation security systems. 
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2 Side-channel Attacks 
2.1 Introduction 
Side-channel attacks are attacks using information that is unintentionally disclosed. Attacks 
of this kind are systematically studied since the mid 90ies. Today numerous attacks are 
known (see [8] for a review), many of them very dangerous. 
 
Side-channel attacks on symmetric [1, 6, 7, 9, 14, 19, 20] and asymmetric [10, 11, 12, 13, 26] 
encryption algorithms have obtained attention since about ten years. A wealth of such at-
tacks is described in the literature (a few examples given above). An overview over padding 
attacks is given by [19]. We will give a very general description of encipherment and deci-
pherment mechanisms in section 2.2. and sketch some attacks in section 2.3. 
 
The safest way to prevent these attacks is to combine encryption with authentication. Re-
search is therefore focusing on the development of new combined authenticated encryption 
security mechanisms [15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21]. Overviews are given by [21] and slightly more 
detailed [20]. We will explain the effect of authentication in section 2.4. 
 
The new insights have entered into recent revisions of international standards [2, 3, 22], 
though the innovation process is still ongoing and final, globally approved results are not yet 
available. We will describe the CCM authenticated encryption mechanism [25] and the  
CCMP protocol standard [22, section 8.3.3] in section 3, point out some finesses that must 
be considered and express our recommendation for next generation systems to use CCM, 
whose security has been proven in [23] and confirmed in [20, 21]. 
2.2 Encipherment and Decipherment 
Encipherment and decipherment conforms to a very general scheme. Encipherment mecha-
nism take a plaintext P as input and produce a ciphertext C as output. Most mechanisms do 
this in two steps. First, they bring P in a certain format, using a formatting function F and pro-












For decryption, the decryption transform D reproduces T from C, and format validation V is 
performed, yielding "INVALID" if T is (for whatever reasons) not well-formatted, whereas re-
















The reason for this complication is, that, while encipherment algorithms are bijective func-
tions, formatting rules are not generally surjective. Prominent examples are: 
 
• padding functions, extending an arbitrary bit string to a multiple of octets or blocks 
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• encoding functions, such as ASCII, Base64, BER-TLV 
• checksums, such as checkdigits and CRCs, appending redundancy to a text 
2.3 Attacks on Decipherment Mechanisms 
The most commonly used encipherment mechanisms are the modes of operation standard-
ized in [3], namely CFB and OFB mode, as well as the CBC mode standardized in [24]. 
These mechanisms all share the property, that for decipherment the ciphertext C is XORed 
with the keystream Z to obtain the intermediary text T: 
 
 C Z T⊗ 6  
 
This particularity allows for two kinds of attacks. 
2.3.1 Manipulation of Message Contents 
Though these mechanisms perfectly hide the plaintext from an eavesdropper, they do not 
protect it against manipulation2. An attacker intercepting the ciphertext C can modify some 
bits of C und thus effect a modification of the text T. 
 
Let's now assume that the attacker has sufficient knowledge of T, e.g. he knows that some 
bit of T expresses a "no" response on an authorization request, then he can turn this into a 
"yes", just by XORing the ciphertext with "yes" XOR "no".  
2.3.2 Disclosure of Message Contents 
If the attacker knows nothing about T, then from C alone he cannot gain information about T. 
But, using the technique described in the previous section, he can manipulate T and learn 
from the behavior of the receiver if the manipulations result in valid or invalid texts. The litera-
ture calls this validation attacks, wherein the receiver acts as a validation oracle. If the for-
matting rule F has certain properties, then a validation attack may yield significant informa-
tion about T and thus P.  
 
Indeed when CBC mode with padding rule 3 from [5], or rule 1 in conjunction with a length 
parameter, is used for encipherment, then the attacker can completely recover the plaintext 
P with only few trials, as shown e.g. in [6]. If padding rule 2 is used (sometimes called OZ 
padding, as a single 1-bit and 0-bits up to the next block boundary are appended), then [19] 
proves that no attack is possible, unless the attacker has some prior knowledge of the plain-
text, which however is the case in many practical scenarios. 
 
Thus side-channel information about the receiver's format validation result in conjunction with 
contents manipulation allows a partial or total breach of confidentiality. This situation is very 
unsatisfactory, as encodings, formatting rules and paddings are not generally considered se-
curity-relevant.  
2.4 Adding Authentication 
The above attacks did succeed because there was no message integrity. So let's protect it by 
adding authentication. However, as we are going to see, lack of integrity protection is not the 
primary and only deficiency. The order of operations is as well critical. 
2.4.1 Krawczyk's Attack Scenario 
[1] describes an attack on a specific encryption scheme which is perfectly secure against 
chosen plaintext attacks because it relies on a one-time pad.  
                                                
2 They do not claim to provide anything else than confidentiality. 
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The encryption mechanism E* is defined in [1] as follows: Given an n-bit plaintext x, E* first 
applies the encoding F below followed by the encryption function E, i.e. 
 
 ( ) ( )( )*E x E F x= . 
 





where | denotes a randomized choice. The bit pair 11 is not a valid encoding result. On de-
coding it yields "invalid". 
 
[1] describes the following attack when only encryption E* is used: The attacker A flips two ci-
phertext bits and sends the modified ciphertext c' to the destination4. If A obtains information 
on whether the decoding of c' yielded a valid result or not, then A can determine the value of 
the bit whose encoding was modified. 
 
[1] then considers the case where the message is authenticated by appending a MAC M and 
afterwards encrypting by the function E*. The receiver will first decrypt the message, obtain-
ing sometimes INVALID, sometimes a valid plaintext. In the latter case the MAC is verified. 
As one easily sees, nothing changes by adding authentication: The attack still works as be-
fore. 
 
Thus the source of trouble seems to be the INVALID outcome of the format validation step 
during decryption. But this is only half of the truth, as we will learn from the next scenario. 
2.4.2 Improved Attack Scenario 









The attacker again switches two bits. But now, the encodings do not any longer become in-
valid. Thus, this encoding combined with one-time pad encipherment, as in the previous sec-
tion, is perfectly secure. But when adding authentication, it becomes insecure, as in one half 
of the cases the plaintext will be the same, in the other half different!  
 
You can do even better: First switch the first bit and submit the message to the receiver. If he 
accepts, then you know that you got a zero bit. If he rejects, then take the original ciphertext 
and switch the second bit. If it is rejected as well, then the bit is one else zero. 
 
Here the addition of authentication makes things worse! Format validation does not raise any 
rejections, but authentication does. What is common to the previous scenario is, that some 
manipulations do change the plaintext, others don't. And authentication perfectly detects 
these conditions! 
                                                
3 [1] claims such encodings to be in use by common encryption schemes. However, [3] only recommends padding, [2] redun-
dancy addition (see e.g. appendix D). 
4 Here [1] tacitly assumes that E have a linear output function, which is the case for one time pads (OTP) and various other 
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2.4.3 Secure Scenario 
The above scenarios are somewhat unusual, as the MAC is computed from plaintext P, the 
result is formatted with formatting rule F and then enciphered with transform E. 
 
More common is the following order: Take the plaintext P, create the formatted text T, calcu-
late the MAC M from T and append it to T, finally create the ciphertext C from T+M.  
 
As all standardized encipherment functions are bijective, any manipulation of C will cause a 
change of T+M on the receiver side. Thus MAC verification will always fail. Any manipulated 
message will be rejected. The attacker does not experience any differences and does not 
learn anything. The scheme is perfectly secure5! 
 
In the terminology of [1] this is the AtE scheme. [1] promotes another scheme, EtA, and 
proves its security.  
2.4.4 Conclusion 
Let us be slightly more precise and indicate the formatting step by the letter F, authentication 
by A and encryption by E, and summarize our findings in a table: 
 
Scenario Operations Secure 
section 2.4.1 A F E no 
section 2.4.2 A F E no 
section 2.4.3 F A E yes 
EtA of  [1] F E A yes 
 
As formatting of the ciphertext does not make much sense, F can only be at the first or the 
second position. The table thus contains all reasonable orders of operations. The secure ver-
sions are those starting with the formatting F. 
 
Evidently, for security 
 
• F must come before A and E. 
• The order of A and E does not matter6. 
 
The cryptographic transforms must be applied to the formatted text T, not to the plaintext P. 
2.5 Authenticated Encryption 
As we have seen, remedy is found by applying authentication and encryption to the format-
ted text T. The idea is that authentication make manipulations of the attacker detectable, the 
receiver thus return "INVALID" whenever the attacker manipulates the ciphertext, for all ma-
nipulations without any differentiation, thus the attacker not learn anything at all. Let's make 









                                                
5 As proven in [1] and [19]. 
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Firstly, the plaintext P is formatted with the formatting rule F, yielding the formatted text T. 
From T the authentication mechanism A computes the MAC M. The MAC is appended to T 
(the + sign denotes concatenation) and enciphered with the encipherment mechanism E, 
yielding the ciphertext C. 
 
The receiver of the ciphertext C first decrypts it, obtains T and M, verifies the authenticity of T 
by re-calculating the MAC and comparing it with M, validates the format and, if it is valid, re-
covers the plaintext P. In case of negative authentication outcome he returns "MAC failure", 














Any change of C causes a change of T and/or M. Thus M' will mismatch M with high prob-
ability. Therefore the attacker does not obtain any significant amount of information about the 
plaintext. 
 
The following two precautions are absolutely essential for security: 
 
1. The MAC must be calculated from the formattet text, T, but never from the unfor-
matted plaintext P. Would one calculate the MAC from the plaintext P, then some 
changes of C could cause a change of P, some not. The latter would pass the MAC 
verification step, the former not, and the attacker would again learn something about 
the structure of P. 
2. The receiver must output the validation result (i.e. either INVALID or P) if and only if 
the authentication did succeed, i.e. 'M M= . Otherwise he acts again as a validation 
oracle. 
3. The receiver must avoid any difference in timing between MAC failure and INVALID 
cases. Otherwise an attacker may infer the attack information from timing. It is advis-
able to perform both, MAC verification and format validation, in all cases. 
 
Current standards such as [3] and [5] provide independent mechanisms, A and E, for enci-
pherment and authentication. In the future we will see combined authenticated encryption 
mechanisms, A-E, such as [15]. But the above precautions will remain indispensable. The 
sender will always apply A-E to T, the receiver apply D-A to T, not to P. And he will always 
disclose the validation result only in case of positive authentication. 
2.6 Hints 
How then should one treat these error conditions, implementers may ask. Well, as today's 
communications channels are virtually error-free, any MAC failure is strong evidence for ei-
ther an attempted attack or a severe, probably permanent malfunction of a system compo-
nent. An ill-formatted text T with valid MAC indicates a malfunction (e.g. a program bug). In 
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INVALID if T is not well formatted
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1. Return an error response to the sender (caution: respect the precautions listed in the 
previous section). 
2. Record the error event in the error log. 
3. Either cancel the communications session, or allow for very few (say 3) retries. 
4. If re-initializing the session, make sure that new keys with sufficient unpredictability 
(preferably true randomness, not just pseudo-randomness) are established. 
5. Implement an auditing process analyzing the error log, investigating the source of the 
error and taking appropriate action. This is essential both to repair malfunctioning 
components and for security. The details of such a process depend on the system. In 
a Web server it may be appropriate to regularly view error log statistics, having a look 
at individual log entries only if the statistics are above normal. In a peer-to-peer com-
munication system, every event may be worth investigating. 
 
One more word of caution for those wishing to design their own scheme: Do not replace the 
function A just by a key-less hash function. Function A must include a cryptographic key, 
otherwise some attacks are again possible. 
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In the year 2004 the NIST has published an authenticated encipherment mechanism named 
CCM [25]. The name stands for CTR-mode encipherment and CBC-MAC authentication. 
This is exactly what CCM does. CTR mode is specified in [24] and CBC-MAC in [5]. Thus 
CCM uses currently standardized mechanisms as building blocks.  
 
CCM moreover strictly specifies the procedures for authenticated encryption and decryption. 
This specification fits into the scheme given in section 2.3 above, using CBC-MAC for A and 
CTR mode encipherment for E, even more restrictive by demanding the use of "INVALID" for 
both, negative authentication and format errors. 
 
CCM does not restrict the formatting rule F beyond the evident requirement that F must not 
loose information. Formatting of different plaintexts, P and P', must yield different formattet 
texts, ( )T F P=  and ( )' 'T F P= : 
 
 ' 'P P T T≠ ⇒ ≠  
 
CMM specifies that the same key K be used for both mechanisms, A and E. 
 
The following details are essential for security: 
 
1. The first block of text T contains a nonce value which must be unique for all mes-
sages over the whole lifetime of the key K, and distinct from any counter value.  
2. All counter values must be distinct over the whole lifetime of the key K. 
3. The MAC is enciphered with the keystream value, S0, derived from the first counter 
value, Ctr0. 
 
CCM has been proven secure in [23]. 
 
CCM has recently been adopted by the CCMP specification [22]. CCMP is the CCM protocol, 
replacing the WEP protocol in wireless local area networks (WLAN). CCMP requires the 
nonces to be message sequence numbers. The receiver must check these sequence num-
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CCM is well-designed and its security has been well analyzed and proven. It is easily imple-
mented and can be combined with various key management schemes. For the next genera-
tion systems CCM is the method we recommend. New methods should be adopted once 
they have received global approval and are incorporated into international standards.   
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